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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is aimed at rationalizing the recurring outbreak of extremist movements, with a 
focus on their link with corruption. We will describe this connection with the help of a 
rational choice model involving a causal relationship between the presence of corruption in a 
country and the popular support granted to an extremist movement. 
Our reasoning is that there is a causal link between how much a governing class is corrupted 
and the presence of violent extremism. As a matter of fact, corruption on a large scale often 
results in and from poor governance, and leads to a framework characterized by anger, moral 
outrage and strong refusal for a system that allows a strict circle of people to thrive through 
dishonesty. Sarah Chayes (2016) describes several possible elements of corruption that drive 
people to join extremist movements: the humiliation inflicted on victims, the lack of recourse, 
the structure and sophistication of corruption networks or the colossal sums being stolen. 
Anyway, this link, despite corruption being a common denominator of violent extremisms, is 
many times overlooked or ignored by who is in charge to find countermeasures to extremism 
and terrorism.  
First of all, in chapter 2 we will analyze the main reasons that generate extremism, its goals 
and strategies according to the principal economic policy literature, while at the same time 
looking for a definition of what can be considered an "extremist movement".  
After that, in chapter 3 we will briefly illustrate the major features and consequences of 
corruption and we will go deeper through the theoretical explanations of why it can create a 
context where extremism can prosper.  
Furthermore, chapter 4 will discuss the reasons behind the link between corruption and 
extremism, providing some anecdotal evidence from the Indonesian elections of the first 
2000s. Further on in the same chapter we will give an overview of the main other theoretic 
models aimed at explaining what could generate grievances, rebellion or extremism within a 
community. We will revise also the main models giving a rational explanation to the strategies 
of terrorism and we will discuss how those acts can fit in a rational choice model. 
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Chapter 5 will be dedicated to describing the outbidding between Palestinian factions during 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, outlining the use of terrorism as a signaling device.  
Then, we will present in chapter 6 the core of this thesis: a new model explaining what can 
influence the popular support to an extremist party, with a connection to the degree of 
corruption of the incumbent government. We will describe how citizens decide in a context of 
electoral competition, with the extremist party opposed to a more moderate alternative. 
Moreover, we will explain the characteristics of the various possible equilibria of the model 
and we will discuss in which situations it is more likely for extremist movements to gather 
popular consensus.  
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2. EXTREMISM 
 
When can an organization be considered an extremist political movement? Essentially, 
extremism can be defined as holding an extreme ideology or belief: some ideologies or 
religions in fact have this intrinsic feature for which they can be followed either in an extreme 
or in an intermediate manner.  
There is often some blurring between extremism and terrorism since in many cases these two 
terms can overlap, and an extremist movement may be also a terrorist one. However, this 
overlapping does not have to be necessary. Terrorism is characterized by political violence 
targeting “noncombatants” with various and different goals that we will describe later on. 
Extremism does not unavoidably feature violence or intention to hurt specific groups of 
people. With no doubts these two terms may coincide since acts of terrorism such as killing of 
civilians could be put in motion because terrorists hold an extreme view of an ideology, but it 
does not have to be always the case. Thus, a terrorist may not necessarily be an extremist: for 
example, in the case of the secessionist Irish movement people had a reasonable view of the 
entitlements of their nation to be independent but still committed acts of terrorism because it 
was probably the only way to achieve them. Moreover, extremism does not in every case 
imply terrorism since holding extreme view of an ideology does not mean to be prone to 
committing violent acts. 
A political organization may manifest its extremism through the behavior of its supporters: 
their beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies that are far from the ordinary and thus 
extreme. It is often hard to define what is ordinary and what is far from ordinary, since these 
definitions are meant to adapt to the cultural, social and historical framework where a group 
emerges. Peter Coleman and Andrea Bartoli (2003), while trying to define extremism, argue 
that “Typically, the same extremist act will be viewed by some as just and moral (such as pro-
social "freedom fighting"), and by others as unjust and immoral (antisocial "terrorism") 
depending on the observer's values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of their relationship 
with the actor”. 
Therefore, while talking about extremism it is necessary to keep in mind that some flexibility 
is needed, and that the classification of a movement as extremist must be flexible to the 
context where the movement is born. 
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In the case of our model we will consider a political party which is considered to be extremist 
since it has way stronger ideological roots than another moderate party present in the political 
framework described. This extremist movement will have also the possibility to engage in 
violent terrorism, but will not be obliged to do so. 
 
2.a Factors that may generate extremism 
What are the reasons that could drive people to join extremists and rise up against their 
government? And what allows the extremist movements to prosper and to increase their 
popular support? There could be a vast variety of motives and scopes, always in relation to the 
socio-economic and historical framework in which these movements arise. Let us give an 
overview of what the existing economic policy literature said about this topic. 
The United States Agency for International Developments provides a summary of economic 
factors affecting violent extremism and divides them in three main categories: 
• Enabling environment factors (for example, weak states with ineffective security 
services or even public support for violent extremist groups); 
• Pull factors (which frequently work on individual level, attracting people to join 
extremists; a pull factor could be for instance the provision of goods and services not 
guaranteed to citizens by the incumbent government); 
• Push factors (that are usually socioeconomic, political, and cultural in nature: in other 
words, factors that shove people to seek an escape from their lives through affiliation 
with extremist groups; a common example of a push factor is social exclusion) 
  
The distinction between “push” and “pull” factors is recurrent in many econometric studies 
about the roots of extremism and some authors have been trying to understand which of the 
two effects is prevalent. For instance, considering extremism as outbreak of rebellion within a 
country, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) investigate whether rebellion is motivated 
more by greed (opportunity) or grievances existing among rebels. They discuss this matter 
with the help of a detailed econometric model considering 79 civil wars during the period 
1960-1999, with several proxies for opportunity and for grievances linked to the probability 
of outbreak of civil conflicts. They find out that rebellion seems to be more motivated by 
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greed than by grievances in most of the cases they took into consideration. The factors used as 
proxies of opportunity that statistically best predict the probability of conflict onset are: 
• Presence of natural resources that can be extorted by insurgents. 
• Diasporas (meant as scattering of a group from a country) of citizens, that increases 
the risk of conflict renewal. 
• Male secondary education, per capita income, income growth rate, that all reduce 
conflict risk since they can be interpreted as proxies of the earnings foregone during 
rebellion. 
• Dispersed population. 
Within all the variables used to proxy grievances among the population, only the size of 
population positive influences the risk of conflict. To interpret this link, the authors argue that 
a bigger population is also more ethnically/religiously heterogeneous, with an increased 
probability of distinct groups entering in a conflict.  
Sarah Chayes (2015) explains how the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 were to be 
considered a revolt against Western-fueled kleptocracies across the entire region. She argues 
that rebellion, which was expressed through Islamic extremism, exploded due to the popular 
frustration about the failure of existing legal systems and political institutions, which were in 
charge to protect citizens from their corrupt rulers. This hypothesis is reinforced by Natascha 
S. Neudorfer and Ulrike G. Theuerkauf (2014), who add one more factor that could fuel 
extremist groups: ethnic diversity. Grievances, they claim, are more likely to happen among 
those ethnic groups who cannot take advantage from existing corrupt practices, and likewise 
ethnicity can become a fault line of violent conflicts. We will go more in details about the link 
between corruption and extremism in chapter 4, since this connection is fundamental in order 
to build our model. 
Furthermore, Michael Ross (2006) points out that natural resources such as oil and other 
minerals tend to foster rebellion and civil wars as they make independence more desirable for 
resource-rich regions. This resource abundance could even become a damnation, as many 
other economists point out (the "resource curse" is how it is defined the paradox for which 
countries with loads of natural resources tend to have less economic growth, less democracy, 
and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources), and can 
trigger nationalist and separatist conflicts. There are more contributes that support this link 
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between resources and civil violence onset, and many analysts give explanations based more 
on politics than economics (e.g., see Auty (2004), Humphreys (2005), Snyder and Bhavnani 
(2005), for arguments based on state strength). According to their view, resource-rich 
economies are more likely to suffer from weak and unaccountable leadership, and thus are not 
able to diversify the economy and guarantee the public goods associated with economic 
prosperity. Alternatively, dictatorships and generally oppressive regimes might be invited by 
resource richness, hence generating genuine grievances among a share of the population 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Furthermore, one of the doubtlessly most crucial factors that pushes citizens to join extremists 
is the lack of a solid government and of sound institutions. A weak state that has scarce 
territorial control gives extremists the possibility of acquiring military and organizational 
skills. The recruitment of followers for extremist groups is way easier without the presence of 
institutions that guarantee security and protection for citizens. There is compelling evidence 
that state weakness is a consistent predictor of the outbreak of civil wars and terrorist attacks, 
as for example the case in Nigeria of Boko Haram demonstrates. Corinne Graff (2010) 
analyses what are the vulnerabilities of a poor and weak state that give to extreme movements 
the chance to prosper: 
• Lack of control over territory, that facilitates recruitment activities. 
• Porous borders, with no barriers for trafficking and passage of weapons and recruits. 
• Lack of effective regulation and weak law system which allow extremists to 
establish illegal businesses and raise funds for their activities. 
• Inadequate social welfare, that causes grievances amongst the population and 
spreads passive support for violent extremism. 
• Corruption, which delegitimizes the government officials at the eyes of the citizens 
and increases their active or passive supports for extremists. 
• Poverty, which makes the life of a rebel more attractive since the legal income 
opportunities are insufficient or unattractive. 
• History of violence and conflict: this causes individuals to search for protection 
joining extremist groups. 
Speaking of the causal link between poverty and extremism, it does not have to be a rule: 
there is a general consensus between researchers that this link is non-existent or really weak. 
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In fact, while in many Muslim countries extremist movements gain most support among 
uneducated impoverished young men with few employment opportunities, in other cases 
extremists are well-educated and high skilled individuals who decide to join the battle for 
social injustice. Moreover, the causality could be reverse: extremism and civil conflicts, in 
fact, may contribute to weaken living standards.   
 
2.b Main strategies of extremism and terrorism 
Extremists may have different goals to achieve, with a vast variety of tactics and strategies to 
pursue them. In this chapter we will examine what might be the strategies of extremist and 
terrorist groups, since it will be useful later to understand the actions of the players in our 
model. As we said when we gave the definition of extremism, an extremist group is not 
necessarily a terrorist organization, but crosses this line as soon as it makes use of more or 
less undiscriminating violence against civilians to directly or indirectly achieve its purposes.   
 
Figure 1 – 10 Deadliest terrorist organizations by numbers killed (2000-2013) 
Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1145300 
In Figure 1, we can observe what have been the deadliest terrorist organizations in the first 
part of the 2000s: Taliban (operating mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan) ranks first. 
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Unfortunately, terrorism has been so successful during last years that between 1980 and 2003 
half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the 
target governments. Hijacking planes, blowing up buses, and kidnapping individuals do not 
give the impression to be rational acts, but these strategies often allow to reach the terrorist 
group's political goals with proved effectiveness. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006) 
describe in detail what are the main strategies implemented by groups such as Al Qaeda, 
Hamas and Tamil Tigers. These organizations always start in a position of weakness with 
respect to the government in force to which they stand against: since it is hard for weak actors 
to make credible threats, terrorists are pushed to display publicly just how far they are willing 
to go to obtain their desired results. Given that it will be useful later to our model, we now 
focus on the terrorist strategies of costly signaling, that are mainly five: attrition, intimidation, 
provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the 
enemy that they are strong enough to impose considerable costs if it keeps following a 
particular policy. Instead, terrorists using intimidation try to persuade the population that 
they are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop 
them, so that people are pushed to behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an 
attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which 
would radicalize the population and move them to support the terrorists. Moreover, spoiling 
attacks aim at convincing the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and 
untrustworthy, thus undermining the attempts to reach a peaceful agreement. Finally, factions 
engaged in outbidding use violence to demonstrate to the domestic audience that the 
terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy 
of support. Being in charge to find effective antiterrorist policies means also having a clue of 
these five distinct strategic logics. 
To further categorize these strategies, we choose two variables that distinguish them: 
uncertainty and target of persuasion. Uncertainty has indeed always been understood to be a 
cause of conflict.  The disagreement could be for example about each party's power, resolve 
or willingness to fight but also about trustworthiness: if individuals do not trust each other, 
they have an incentive to start an attack, instead of risking to be attacked by surprise. In these 
situations of uncertainty, communication has a key role in preventing conflict. Unfortunately, 
since talk is cheap, verbal statements are usually not convincing enough, thus players have to 
bear costs in order to signal their power/resolve/trustworthiness. The ultimate example of 
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costly signaling is war itself, or the willingness to endure it, that may be used as a forceful 
signal of resolve and could provide believable information regarding power and capabilities. 
Moreover, what could be the target that extremists want to persuade? One is definitely the 
government in charge, that may grant concessions over policy or territory to these extreme 
factions. The other possible target of persuasion is the domestic audience, which is 
fundamental in providing resources to the extremist group. Figure 2 below displays the 
possible combinations between the three subjects of uncertainty we mentioned (power, 
resolve, trustworthiness) and the two targets of persuasion (hostile government and domestic 
audience): we obtain the five strategies we listed previously.  
 
Figure 2 – Main strategies of terrorism 
 
Source: Kydd a. and Walter B., “Strategies of Terrorism”, International Security, Vol. 
31, No. 1 (Summer 2006) 
 
It is possible that an extremist group pursues more than one of these strategies at the same 
time, to be more effective in achieving its goals. If we think for example of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, they could belong to both an attrition and a provocation strategy. On one hand 
Al-Qaeda could have been trying to weaken the financial core of United Stated by targeting 
its heart, raising thus the costs of the USA policy of keeping soldiers in Saudi Arabia. On the 
other hand, Al-Qaeda may have attempted to provoke an extreme military response from 
United States, that would later radicalize the world’s Muslim population. 
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It’s necessary to take a deeper look at the possible strategic moves of extremists, to further 
understand what objectives they could pursue and how they chase them. In addition, we will 
discuss which conditions favor the success of these five strategies. 
ATTRITION 
As we said before, the task of a strategy of attrition is to convince the hostile part that the 
extremist group has enough power and resolve to inflict serious damages and to cause huge 
problems to its counterpart. In this context, the more harmful a terrorist attack is, the more 
credibility the group gains at the eyes of the government: consequently, the more likely it is 
that the government will grant concessions. We could list numerous examples of this attrition 
strategy but perhaps the most significant one is provided by Hezbollah and Hamas in their 
attacks against Israel. Yahya Ayyash (one of the most influential figures of Hamas), in a letter 
written in the early 1990s, declared that their target was to “make the cost of occupation that 
much more expensive in human lives, that much more unbearable”. Suicide terrorism is a 
solution often chosen by weak nationalist actors in order to inflict huge damages to opponent 
occupiers: the more costs extremists are able to inflict, the more likely it will be that the 
enemy will withdraw its occupying forces. 
Focusing on the conditions that could influence the effectiveness of a strategy of attrition, we 
can list three: the state's level of interest in the issue under dispute, the constraints on its 
ability to retaliate, and its sensitivity to the costs of violence. If a state holds more interests for 
example in a territory that claims independence or if it has greater retaliation strategies, it will 
be more difficult for extremists to obtain the concessions they ask for. Often democracies, for 
instance, are more reluctant to harshly repress violent extremism than authoritarian regimes. 
Also, the sensitivity to costs of violence is affected by regime type: democracies may be less 
able to tolerate the painful effects of terrorism than non-democracies.  
One of the most famous examples of an attrition strategy pursued by a terrorist group is al-
Qaeda's war with the United States. Al Qaeda's goal - policy change - is well suited to an 
attrition strategy and their deceased leader Bin Laden had frequently argued that the United 
States lacked the resolve to fight a long war of attrition.  
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INTIMIDATION 
Intimidation is the strategy used by extremists to demonstrate to their own population that 
they have power to punish whoever disobeys them and that the government is unable to 
counteract effectively.  
Usually, this strategy is implemented by targeting the government’s key figures and 
supporters, such as mayors, police, prosecutors, and pro-regime citizens. One of the goals of 
terrorists using intimidation may be to gain wider social control over the population: pursuing 
this strategy could be effective in contexts where a government refuses to implement a policy 
that both terrorists and part of the population favor. Here terrorists may use selective violence 
to obtain compliance among citizens: an example of this situation is provided by American 
anti-abortion groups bombing clinics during the 80s and 90s to prevent individuals from 
performing or seeking abortion.    
If the extremists pursue social control, facing a weak state will help them in implementing an 
intimidation strategy. When the justice system is unable to punish and prevent crimes linked 
to intimidation, citizens will be more prone to search protection from non-state factions (for 
example, local militias). Moreover, if some sympathizers or even member of the extremist 
group are part of the justice system, an intimidation strategy will find fertile ground since 
police and courts will be less able to prosecute crimes. 
PROVOCATION 
Let’s discuss now the strategy of provocation, in which an extremist group wants to persuade 
the domestic audience that the target of the attack is untrustworthy and must be fought 
against. In some cases, the goal is to “radicalize” a moderate part of the population and to 
make them lose faith in the incumbent regime. Moreover, if a government decides to respond 
to an attack, it may reveal essential information about itself to the population. This is the 
thesis developed by Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), who argue that if a government 
implements an undiscriminating counterterrorism response to an attack it will convince many 
citizens that it is unconcerned with their welfare. Thus, the constraints that the government 
has on retaliation constitute a relevant factor that strongly influences the effectiveness of a 
provocation strategy: if a government is unable to discriminate its counterterrorism attacks to 
hit only terrorists, it will be a good target for a provocation strategy. A large-scale military 
response, for example, may radicalize a moderate part of the population and make it more 
 
 
13 
 
favorable to extremists’ arguments. Unfortunately, the more a counterterrorism tool is 
discriminating (for instance, infiltrating terrorist cells, sharing intelligence with other 
countries or arresting individuals), the less it is visible to the public. Consequently, Bueno de 
Mesquita claims that democratic leaders are often forced to engage in the more public and 
thus undiscriminating counterterror strategies. Even if these steps could be provocative, the 
governments many times need to visibly prove to their domestic audience that they are taking 
sufficient actions against the terrorists. Nevertheless, the ideal response to a provocation 
strategy would be a discriminating attack that causes as little collateral damage as possible.  
SPOILING 
A spoiling strategy is usually addressed at preventing the enemy from reaching a peaceful 
settlement with a moderate faction on the terrorists' side, making their negotiations 
unsuccessful. This strategy is often implemented when a likely peace agreement threatens the 
terrorists' more far-reaching goal. We consider the target of spoiling to be the enemy in the 
sense that the goal is to persuade it not to trust that the moderates on the terrorists' side will 
abide the peace deal. Indeed, the possibility of settling an agreement in these cases always 
makes the two parties doubtful that the terms will be respected. A spoiling strategy is more 
successful when the moderate faction on terrorists' side seems stronger and therefore more 
able to stop terrorism acts: in this case a terrorist attack convinces the enemy that moderates 
are not so powerful to suppress their own extremists. For instance, Israelis frequently 
questioned whether Yasser Arafat was simply not able to end terrorist attacks against Israel or 
did not want to do so. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the Oslo peace 
process, was prevented from settling peaceful agreements because of the often spoilers that 
usually coincided with violent attacks by Hamas. These acts were effective in increasing the 
mistrust between the two parties. 
OUTBIDDING 
The emergence of outbidding is frequent whenever two parties of a group (usually, a more 
extreme versus a moderate one) are competing to gain the support of a population not sure of 
which one best represents their interests. The competition between Hamas and Al-Fatah to 
obtain the Palestinian population’s support in the negotiation with Israel is the classic 
example of this situation. This strategy will be implemented in our model, which will describe 
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how outbidding can be most effective in an electoral competition between two parties, with 
citizens uncertain of which one to choose.  
Usually, the most extreme party’s political program aims at obtaining a really high outcome 
but with a certain degree of risk, while the moderates seek a compromise with the enemy, 
reducing the struggle but also the final outcome. The extremist group may want to advertise 
its type and that its only purpose is reaching its ultimate goal without compromises: a terrorist 
attack could help signaling this to the domestic audience. We can list some examples where 
groups have incentives in being seen as more “extreme” by citizens: 
• in bargaining contexts, it is more advantageous to be represented by an agent who is 
more hard-line, because he is more likely to obtain a better compromise with the 
enemy and to refuse inferior deals: this is the reason why many Palestinians preferred 
to support Hamas in the negotiations with the Israeli government; 
• if citizens believe that a conflict with their adversary is inevitable, having a tougher 
party representing them usually increases the expected chances of winning this 
conflict; 
• citizens know that being put in charge of governing could increase the probability of 
according with the enemy on unfavorable terms: signaling to be on more extreme 
positions demonstrates a greater commitment to the cause and thus a lower chance of 
“giving in” to the enemy once in charge. 
Outbidding is more likely to arise when there are multiple groups competing for the 
allegiance of a homogeneous demographic base of support. It is interesting to note that in this 
strategy the effects that a possible violent attack has on the enemy is not so important for the 
terrorists since the main target of influence is the domestic audience.  
 
2.c Goals of extremists 
In addition, looking at the usual ultimate goals of extremists, we can gather them in five main 
categories that have had more importance during these last decades: regime change, territorial 
change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance. Regime change is clearly 
the overthrow or replacement of the government in charge with one closer to the terrorists' 
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needs or even led by them. This has been the final goal of many Marxists groups such as 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Besides, territorial change means taking a 
territory away from a state either with the intention to establish a new state (as the Tamil 
Tigers tried to do in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka) or to join another state (the goal of Lashkar-e 
Tayyiba, who are seeking to incorporate Indian Kashmir into Pakistan). A wider category is 
policy change: here we could include Al Qaeda's object to make USA drop their support for 
Israel and corrupt Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, we have social control 
that constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the state. We can find an example of an 
organization seeking social control in the United States looking at groups such as Ku Klux 
Klan, which is pursuing the continued oppression of African Americans after the Civil War. 
Finally, status quo maintenance means bolstering an existing regime or a territorial 
arrangement against political groups that seek to change it. Many Latin-American right-wing 
paramilitary organizations, for instance the United Self-Defence Force of Colombia, have 
chased this goal but also protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland defended the 
maintenance of the territorial status quo (Northern Ireland as British territory) against IRA’s 
demand that the territory was transferred to Ireland. 
Let's sum up these goals with the help of Figure 3 below: here we list the range of possible 
goals with their respective frequency and the terrorist organizations that pursued them. 
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Figure 3 – Main terrorist organizations and their ultimate goals 
As we can see, regime change is the most common goal, also because it is the most generic 
one and may have a wide variety of aspects. 
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3. CORRUPTION 
 
Delineating corruption looks simpler than defining extremism but actually it is not: it can be 
tricky to mark the border between acceptable gifts and non-acceptable bribes, between useful 
networking and harmful nepotism. This border is again strongly dependent on the cultural 
features of a society, that usually give the base to outline what can be acceptable or not. 
Therefore, the definition we are looking for must be somehow culturally-flexible, given the 
differences that we mentioned in terms of cultures but also in terms of legal systems. 
Transparency International (the global coalition against corruption) defines corruption as “the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain” with three categories (grand, petty and political) 
depending on the amount of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Corruption may be 
divided between: 
• Grand corruption, which is implemented at top government’s levels to distort 
policies or the central functioning of the state, allowing leaders to thrive at the 
expenses of the public good. 
• Petty corruption, that refers to low- and mid-level public officials abusing of their 
power with citizens in order to achieve some private benefit. 
• Political corruption, identified as a “manipulation of policies, institutions and rules 
of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, 
who abuse of their position to sustain their power, status and wealth”. 
Therefore, the private benefits that we mentioned usually coincide with the retention and 
improvement of political decision makers’ power, status and wealth. Thus, the principal 
component of this definition is the public-private dimension, with a corrupt agent that defies 
his public entrusted responsibilities for private purposes. 
Corruption can build up many complex and differentiated systems to conceal the agents 
involved: as we explained previously, it has necessarily to adapt to the context in order to be 
most effective. Now we will examine the possible aspects and vicious mechanisms put in 
motion by corruption. 
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To give a first overview of the possible corrupted practices, we can take a look at the anti-
corruption glossary of Transparency International and list the main ways in which it is 
implemented: 
• Bribery is the offering or promising of an advantage (usually a monetary fee or gift) 
as an inducement for actions against the law or common trust. 
• Clientelism, outlined as an unequal system of exchanging resources and favors that 
exploits a relationship between a wealthier or more powerful ‘patron’ and a less 
wealthy and weaker ‘client’. 
• Collusion, that takes shape in a secret agreement concluded by some parties 
conspiring to deceive or commit fraud in order to obtain illicit financial gain. Usually 
parties involved are called “cartels”. 
• Extortion, named as the “act of utilizing, either directly or indirectly, one’s access to a 
position of power or knowledge to demand unmerited cooperation or compensation as 
a result of coercive threats”. 
• Patronage, that regards a context in which a person is chosen for a job or a 
government benefit not because of his qualifications and entitlements but as a result of 
affiliations and personal connections. 
• Nepotism, which involves some favoritism linked to acquaintances and familiar 
relationships: usually someone in an official position exploits the power and authority 
in his possess to guarantee some private benefit to a friend or member of the family, 
even if he or she is not the most qualified person for that position. 
Now that we have given an overview of the main forms of corruption, let’s summarize what 
could be its consequences. Corruption initiates several vicious mechanisms, as Rico Grimm 
(2009) points out. It may damage a country’s economy and wellness in many distinct aspects: 
• It lowers the quantity of foreign direct investments (Wei 2000). 
• It increases the size of underground economy, thus weakening the available sources of 
taxation and government revenues (Johnson/Kaufmann/ZoidoLobaton 1998). 
• It may lower environmental regulation, therefore encouraging pollution (Welsch 
2004). 
• It promotes economic inequality and reduces citizens' trust in the current government 
(Uslaner 2008). 
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• It slows the economic growth of a country, possibly leading to economic grievances 
(Mauro 1995). 
• It distorts the government's investment decisions: the allocation of public resources to 
sectors entailing limited opportunities for corruption (for example education) is 
lowered in favor of high opportunity ones, such as defense or large infrastructure 
projects (Mauro, 1998). 
Focusing in particular on this last point, we can interpret it as a relation that indirectly links 
corruption to extremists’ recruitment. It becomes clear that if education endowment in a 
country is reduced, it is more likely for a youngster to join extremist movements since its 
employment opportunities decrease without a proper education. 
From empirical evidence it is evident that corruption is path-dependent and its harmful effects 
on society's members are worsened in the long run, as Lambsdorff, Taube and Schramm argue 
(2004). The intrinsic mechanisms of corruption have a self-sustaining nature that facilitates its 
spread, survival and development: beginning a corrupt relationship, for example, may have 
high fixed costs (for instance, the expected legal penalties and spoiling of a company’s 
reputation) but, once started, there is also a huge cost of lock-in. After setting up a corrupt 
system, subsequent acts of corruption will become more profitable and the possibilities of 
being caught red-handed decrease, as presumably the sense of guilt may decrease. Moreover, 
the vicious circles put in motion have the power, after a certain period, to reduce the 
transaction costs of the corruption: for example, a corrupted party that allocates careers and 
nominations only to acquaintances of its leaders will enlarge its network, reducing the 
possibility of being discovered and thus paying a penalty. 
Of course, who is involved in corrupted activities undergoes the risk of being caught and 
punished on the base of the legal provisions. This risk, according to Mariano Mosquera 
(2013) is proportional to three factors. First of all, the probability of getting away with 
corruption is inversely proportional to the number of actors involved in the illicit activity, thus 
the bigger the network the more it is dangerous for who is involved. Furthermore, the ease of 
remaining in the shadow depends on the method of implementation of the corrupt 
relationship, which can be Influence (less costly to be invisible), Agreement or Threat 
(costlier to be invisible). Finally, the probability of getting caught red-handed is contingent on 
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the related actor: it is less complicated to involve in a corrupt network companies, more 
problematic with public servants or citizens. 
How can we measure how much a society is corrupted? Corrupt practices are meant to remain 
hidden and thus difficult to quantify. The solution, if we want to scale different countries in 
terms of corrupted activities, is to speak of “perceived” corruption. The most popular index 
that economists refer to nowadays is the Corruption Perception Index, computed by 
Transparency International. The CPI draws on 13 different surveys and assessments from 12 
different institutions: the African Development Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Global Insight, International Institute for 
Management Development, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, The PRS Group, Inc., 
the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the World Justice Project . These 13 surveys 
can be business people opinion surveys but also performance assessments from a group of 
analysts, and each country must be assessed by three or more sources to have a reliable 
measure on the CPI. All these surveys and assessments are translated into a score that goes 
from 100 (very clean country) to 0 (highly corrupt country): Figure 4 below shows the various 
scores in the 2016 CPI. 
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Figure 4 – The Corruption Perception Index in 2016 all over the world 
 
Source: Transparency International (2016) 
The countries that experienced extremism during the last 50 years all have a really low score 
in this index: for example, Yemen scores 14 (170° in the ranking), Nigeria 28 (136°), Somalia 
10 (176°) and Afghanistan 15 (169°). 
Of course, this index is a proxy and, as we said, corruption is hard to summarize in a single 
score, also because its nature depends on the cultural framework where it is found. The CPI is 
based on perceptions, thus it may be subject to the bias of who is in charge to compute it. 
Moreover, this index has been criticized because it aims to measure only public-sector 
corruption, leaving out private actors. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that this score does 
not give a perfect and complete overview of the corrupt practices present in a country. 
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4. THE LINK BETWEEN EXTREMISM AND CORRUPTION 
 
The focus of this thesis is the relation that brings corruption to favor the arise of extremist 
movements and the outbreak of terrorism. In this chapter we will discuss the fundamental 
features of this link.  
Countries characterized by elevated levels of corruption are more likely to suffer conflict. 
Figure 5 below shows the positive correlation between political stability (an index from World 
Governance Indicators) and the absence of corruption (2014 score from World Justice 
Project).  Twelve of the fifteen lowest-ranking countries on Transparency International’s 2013 
Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance, experienced insurgencies, harbour extremist 
groups, or generated other severe threats to international security.  
Figure 5 – Political stability and absence of corruption 
 
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014) 
When a government becomes kleptocratic, it is likely that it will lose its accountability and 
authority at the eyes of the citizens, who could be driven to find extreme solutions to change 
the status quo. Moreover, kleptocracies extinguish or prevent the emergence of institutions 
that can hold them accountable: the result is that corrupted actors’ deeds remain unchecked 
and unpunished. Substantially, a kleptocracy suffocates the moderate political voices that 
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could lead to possible alternatives to current policies and leaders. Tom Malinowski, Assistant 
Secretary of the State Department' Democracy, Human Rights and Labour Bureau, stated: 
"Success in fighting violent extremism depends in part on maintaining the trust between the 
government and the communities where extremists hide and seek recruits. Corruption 
destroys that trust and people start fearing more the authorities supposed to defend them than 
the extremists. And some will be susceptible to the terrorists' propaganda that promises to 
purify the society from this spurge".  
In addition, corruption fuels a sense of alienation and anger within communities that feel 
powerless in front of the vicious system created by corrupted public officials. Consequently, 
joining an extremist group in some situations is a solution adopted by citizens not because 
they share the ideological fanaticism but because extremists often seem the only ones 
powerful and tough enough to stand against the government.  
A clear example of this link is given by the extremist group Boko Haram in Nigeria: the 
corruption within the Nigerian government and its officials is deeply rooted, and the 
extremists' propaganda is funded on the idea that if the constitution was based on the Islamic 
system, the society would be freed from these vices. Extremists find fertile ground across 
Nigerian villages and can easily recruit citizens sick and tired with the repeated injustices of 
public officials.  
Corruption many times generates grievances because it blocks the participation to the political 
life of a nation: if a party has a recruitment system based on nepotism and clientelism it is 
normal that an average citizen will feel marginalized. The political or perceived 
marginalization of certain categories of social groups is believed to increment the probability 
of violent extremism. An example is provided by the post-2003 political settlement in Iraq, 
that failed to involve Sunni Arabs in politics: this failure has been commonly identified as a 
reason of the outbreak of the 2006-07 civil conflict and the subsequent rise of ISIL (Tripp, 
2007; Weiss and Hassan, 2015). 
It is important to point out, however, that corruption is not a sufficient motivation for 
opposition groups or unsatisfied population to take extreme solutions against the government. 
Moreover, saying that corruption automatically increases popular grievances until a level of 
violent rebellion is a bit of a stretch. Indeed, corruption and political stability can coexist 
without much problems. Empirical evidence from many states shows that some kinds of 
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corruption are important in fixing political stability: buying off political opponents and 
extreme adverse factions may be the best thing in a perspective of national interest (Le Billon, 
2003). This could be in fact the most effective tactic in a context of conflict resolution to keep 
or bring back peace. The idea is the following: corruption is capable to feed the greed and 
decrease the grievances of politically refractory groups with an enlargement of the already 
present clientelist network. Here, of course, it will be a key point to discuss the ideological 
adversity to corruption of the group, since of course the philosophy of a political party or 
faction could be restive to corruption. We will analyze further this aspect of contraposition 
between corruption and ideology in our model. 
 
Figure 6 – Corruption-related security incidents since 2008 
 
Source: United States Institute of Peace 
As we said, underdeveloped countries have higher degrees of corruption and thus it will be 
more likely that this will fuel violent extremism. In Figure 6 above, we can take a glance of 
the frequency of corruption-related security incidents from 2008: Middle East and Center-
North African countries experienced a dramatic quantity of these kinds of episodes. For 
instance, Yemen is one of the countries more afflicted by corruption (in the 2016 CPI it ranks 
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within the 20 worst nations in the world), and this is believed to have fueled the impressive 
quantity of conflicts ant terrorist attacks in this country. During the last 50 years Yemen 
experienced several civil conflicts (1962, 1986, 1994 and 2004 with more than 200000 
deaths) that highlighted the government's inability to hold this diverse county together. 
Poverty and corruption, along with the incapacity of Yemen's government to provide basic 
services to its citizens and to create employment, contributed to the rise of extremist groups. 
The threat of violent extremism is unlikely to disappear in this kind of countries without some 
attempt to break this vicious cycle triggered by corruption and state weakness.  
 
4.a Empirical evidence: the case of Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the countries in which corruption among local officials is most deeply 
rooted, with frequent bribery and harassment of ordinary citizens. From the point of view of 
the population, the only possibility to change the situation is represented by political 
elections, when they can hope for a reshaping of the environment. Vernon Henderson and Ari 
Kuncoro (2011) study the correlation between a computed “bribe ratio” and the preferences of 
voters in terms of support to Islamic parties, starting from data of 1999, when Indonesia 
achieved democratization. They argue that parties labelled as Islamic may benefit from a 
perception of being more averse to corruption at the eyes of Indonesian voters. As a matter of 
fact, the main exponents of these parties in Indonesia were perceived to be more honest and 
less easily bribable with respect to secular parties’ politicians, also because Islamic parties 
selected their candidates for election searching people that leaded an “Islamic way of life” 
(Kuran, 2004). 
As we said, corruption is a practice that adapts to the socio-economic context where it 
emerges. In Indonesia, the most popular corrupted activity is bribery, which is very frequent 
between firms and public officials. Firms pay bribes to ease the process of obtaining locally-
set licenses, which are required by Indonesian government, that strictly monitors this license 
compliance. The sample of firms collected by Henderson and Kuncoro averaged about 7 visits 
a year in the period 2001-2004 from public officials and inspectors checking this license 
requirements. In addition, firms may pay bribes also for reasons other than license 
compliance: for example, to decrease the time needed for license renewal or to appease a 
public official who may claim that a plant requires a license that is not needed. Thus, a 
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synthesis of the grade of corruption is this “bribe ratio” computed by Henderson and 
Kuncoro, a percentage of bribe asked over annual total costs by firm. 
The paper examines in depth the effects of local policies on corrupt local officials who have to 
deal with Indonesian firms. Data about bribes are collected from surveys that asked about 
corruption from 2001, the year when Indonesian government was going through the 
decentralization process, until 2004. After fiscal decentralization, each district had full 
responsibility for public services, which included the license mechanism that we mentioned 
before. The political panorama at that time was made of a coalition of 2 long-standing secular 
parties, GOLKAR and PDIP, opposed to Islamic parties such as PKB and PKS. The first 
elections were in 1999, while the second took place in 2004: Figure 7 below plots the 
difference in votes between first and second elections for secular parties in relation with the 
2001-2004 average bribe ratio for each district. 2707 firms are covered in the surveys, while 
data about vote shares cover 87 different districts.  
 
Figure 7 – Correlation between Average Bribe Ratio (2001-2004) and change of percent 
votes for PDIP-GOLKAR between 2004 and 1999 in each district 
 
Source: J. Vernon Henderson and Kuncoro, Corruption and local democratization in 
Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties (2011), Journal of Development Economics, 2011, 
vol. 94, issue 2 
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As we can see, the correlation is negative: the more corrupted had been the district during the 
period 2001-2004, the more the popular support for secular parties decreased turning in 
Islamic parties’ favor. If we take only the answers from the surveys about bribes of 2004, the 
correlation with the change of percent votes for PDIP and GOLKAR is still negative. This is 
shown in Figure 8 below, which displays the correlation between the bribe ratios of 2004 and 
the change of percent votes for secular parties in each district.  
 
Figure 8 – Correlation between Average Bribe Ratio in 2004 and change of percent votes 
for PDIP and Golkar between 2004 and 1999 
 
 
Source: J. Vernon Henderson and Kuncoro, Corruption and local democratization in 
Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties (2011), Journal of Development Economics, 2011, 
vol. 94, issue 2 
 
The data indicate that voters responded to high corruption and bribe rates by favoring the new 
Islamic parties, whose programs emphasized anti-corruption policies. Moreover, in districts 
where this kind of parties had the greater shares of votes, the bribe ratio was actually reduced 
way more with respect to districts with a dominance of secular parties. Of course, there could 
be some objections to this causal link between corruption and assembly composition. For 
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example, Islamic parties may have imposed policies that affected this bribe mechanism in 
indirect ways such as reducing the return on capital of firms with stricter capital requirements: 
a reduced business would mean also less firms to ask bribes. In addition, Islamic parties may 
have generated less bureaucracy with fewer license requirements for firms and thus less 
opportunities for asking bribes. To evaluate these objections, Henderson and Kuncoro perform 
an econometric analysis and reveal that the relationship between bribe ratio and 
firms‘ efficiency is insignificant, and also the effects of changing in regulation (with and 
increase or decrease of bureaucracy) to bribe ratios are not significant at all.  
In Indonesia it was evident that Islamic parties had more credibility with respect to secular 
parties in adopting anti-corruption policies. Islamic candidates seemed to have more integrity, 
possibly because of strong ideological constraints.  
Moving to the link between corruption and extremism, here bribery brought Indonesians to 
prefer Islamic parties, that were not essentially extremist in their political programs.  But 
looking at the definition that we provided previously, we said that extremism is an attitude 
that implies behaviors far from ordinary. For the reasons we explained before, we could 
consider bribery as ordinary in Indonesia, and in the same way politicians turning a blind eye 
on it could be considered normal. Since Islamic parties had strong ideological roots that 
brought its representatives to refuse corruption and fight bribery in any form, the attitude of 
these parties can somehow be considered as “extremist”. 
Our challenge then will be to explain this empirical evidence with the help of our model: the 
interesting issue will be to discuss for what reasons a more ideological party would be less 
prone to corruption with respect to a secular party. Moreover, we will try to find a reasoning 
behind the mechanism that brings people to vote for extremist parties when there is a more 
diffused perception of corruption. 
 
4.b A theoretical approach 
There is a wide economic literature that tried to explain the reasons behind the outbreak of 
extremist movements through rational choice models. We will examine the most interesting 
ones and the most useful with an eye on our model. 
Bruckner and Gruner (2010) investigate the impact of economic growth on the support for 
extremist political parties. They observe that these kinds of movements often offer to 
individuals higher benefits in the short run but likely losses in the long run, due to an 
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increased income uncertainty. Their model analyses the impact of several variables of interest 
on the support for extremist policy platforms:  
• Growth rate, linked to a higher cost of future income risk and thus reducing the 
number of supporters of extreme policies; 
• The discount factor used to discount voters’ payoffs, directly proportioned to support 
to moderate parties; 
• Economic inequality, which raises the support for redistribution policies promoted by 
extremists and might also influence economic growth changes. 
The paper concludes underlining the negative effect of the GDP per capita growth on the 
support for extremist movements across all the OECD countries analyzed. Its interpretation is 
the following: since moderates in most occasions foster the maintenance of the status quo, an 
optimist perception by citizens on GDP growth would then promote moderates’ political 
programs. 
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita built more than one model to portray contexts of domestic 
terrorism, civil wars and citizens facing a choice between supporting the incumbent 
government or an opposed faction. In “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, 
Counterterrorism, and Mobilization” (2007) he depicts a situation in which an extremist 
faction is considering the option of making a terrorist attack against the government. This 
attack would be aimed exclusively at provoking an undiscriminating response of 
counterterrorism that would radicalize the population and thus increment its support to the 
extremist organization. This is the terrorist strategy of provocation that we mentioned 
previously in the chapter “Main strategies of extremists”. Mesquita discusses again how 
counterterrorism policies may influence the beliefs of the population in “Politics and the 
Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror” (2005), in which a government has to decide how to 
allocate a fixed budget for counterterror strategies. The conclusion is that the government is 
forced to allocate an amount of resources larger than the optimal quantity to the strategies 
more observable to the public, since in this way it increases the probability of being re-
elected. There is a kind of moral hazard problem, with the government overinvesting in 
publicly visible strategies: to overcome this issue the author suggests providing the citizens 
with a mechanism able to monitor the unobservable strategies, which would though be 
difficult to implement since those strategies are usually deemed to remain secret.  Another 
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fascinating model that Mesquita has elaborated is theorized in “Regime Change and 
Revolutionary Entrepreneurs” (2010). Also in this case an extremist party has the possibility 
to use terrorism but with the goal of sending a message to the population. In this model the 
observed violence of a terrorist attack is also a function of the “anti-government sentiment” 
within the population, therefore when citizens observe an attack they infer what might be this 
average sentiment level. Having thus a belief of what other citizens think and will do, a 
person will decide whether to join the extremist or not in a conflict against the incumbent 
regime. If the extremist group manages to convince the citizens that there is a diffuse anti-
government sentiment, the mass will mobilize against the government. In this case the most 
intriguing aspect is that terrorism is used as a tool not to signal the characteristics of the 
extremist group (such as strength, resolve, ideology) but to reveal the orientation of the 
population towards the government. Mesquita argues that if an attack is more violent than 
expected, citizens will conclude that there has been a part of the population helping terrorists, 
and this part is therefore ready to mobilize against the government. This use of terrorism as a 
signaling tool in the hands of extremists will be discussed later on in our model. 
Wintrobe (2006) presents another model aimed at interpreting the choices of an extremist 
group. Here extremists must decide whether to adopt extreme methods or not to reach their 
ultimate goals: these kinds of methods (terrorism, violence…) implicate a riskier but 
potentially higher payoff. On the other side, they can resort to moderate actions like voting 
and doing lawful demonstrations that guarantee a fixed and more secure payoff. 
What determines this choice? Wintrobe argues that the critical value is the ratio of the gains 
from successful terrorist pressure to moderate pressure, that gives a dimension of how 
increased would be the returns from being more “extreme” with respect to having a moderate 
approach. This ratio, in turn, depends on the structure of opportunities and on the indivisibility 
of the ultimate goals of the group. The less the goals are divisible, the larger will be the ratio 
mentioned before and the more likely extremist methods will be chosen. Of course, there are 
other factors that influence this choice, such as likelihood that the violent methods will 
succeed or the potential sanctions that the group will bear if it is caught.  The conclusion of 
the paper, finally, is that extremists with divisible objects - such as more income inequality, 
cleaner environment, fewer abortions, fewer control on guns – will not adopt violent 
solutions, while if the goals are more indivisible – for instance the adoption of Shari ‘a or the 
independence of a certain region - more extreme methods are likely to be used. The author 
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suggests an interesting policy to prevent the adoption of extreme methods: making the 
indivisible divisible. If the government manages to “unbundle” the ultimate goals of 
extremists, then there may be ways to satisfy the leaders of the extremist groups and to 
prevent them from choosing violence. Features like federalism, division of powers, checks 
and balances, proportional representation, etc. all guarantee to groups some influence on 
political decisions without giving them what they thought was an indivisible goal. 
P. Collier and A. Hoeffler (1998) give another interesting view about what influences rebels' 
choices and what factors contribute to create the opportunity for conflict. They temporarily 
abandon the discussion about terrorism in favor of an analysis about when it is advantageous 
for a certain group (rebels) to start a conflict or not. In the model presented, the utility of 
rebels from engaging in a hypothetical civil war is dependent on various variables: 
• Probability of victory, which is in turn negatively influenced by military 
expenditures from the government (a proxy of this measure might be the taxable base 
of the country). 
• The capacity of a future rebel government to reward its supporters, in turn 
dependent upon the potential revenues of the government and hence upon the taxable 
base. Thus, the taxable base has an ambiguous effect on the incentive for rebellion, 
both raising and decreasing its potential utility. 
• The size of the population, considered as a proxy of the geographic and cultural 
fractionalization within a country, which increases the chances of a civil conflict. 
• Cost of rebellion, linked to the expected duration of the conflict and the per capita 
income of the population (that can also be considered as a cost opportunity of who 
decides to rebel). 
The resulting rebels’ utility function is therefore a difference between the expected gains and 
the expected costs from a conflict, as we can see in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9 – Utility function from engaging in a conflict in the Collier-Hoeffler model 
Source: Collier P. and Hoeffler A., “On Economic Causes of Civil War” (1998), Oxford 
Economic Papers Vol. 50 
For any potential rebel, there is a maximum expected duration of warfare that determines the 
threshold above which rebellion is the best strategy to adopt. The paper focuses then on this 
expected duration value of the warfare and analyzes what factors may influence it. Therefore, 
one of the conclusions reached by Collier and Hoeffler is that if rebels have perfect foresight, 
so that the expected duration coincides with the actual duration, the observed duration of civil 
wars will be: 
• an increasing function of the probability of rebels’ victory times the taxable capacity 
of the economy. 
• An increasing function of the size of the population. 
• A decreasing function of per capita income and of coordination costs for rebels.  
J. Fearon (2007) as well describes the variables influencing the risks of civil war with the help 
of a rational choice model. He proposes a framework where rebels and government are the 
only two players and describes their process of recruitment of new rebels or soldiers. One of 
the first findings is that the poorest fractions of society will sign up on one of these two sides, 
while the other citizens will keep on working in the normal economy. But the main conclusion 
that Fearon’s paper reaches is the empirical association between higher incomes and lower 
civil war risks. The interpretation is the following: richer countries are often associated with 
natural terrains not suitable for guerrilla practices (for instance, hiding) and with more 
efficient capability of state military corps to conduct counterinsurgency. Therefore, a higher 
income country makes it more difficult for rebels to succeed and recruit new people. 
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David Mason (1996) theorizes instead a model where the government and a rebel opposition 
compete to gain the support of the population by providing them goods and services or by 
threatening them with sanctions. Then, the representative peasant can choose his level of 
support to rebels' activities, from the least supportive strategy (betraying them and providing 
information to the government) to the most supportive with an active and overt support. The 
conclusion of the paper is that “nonelites”, or in other words ordinary citizens, base their 
concerns more on economic survival and avoidance of violence than on the abstract 
ideological doctrines of the two factions. In addition, Mason argues that the accommodative 
counterinsurgency strategies are more effective in shifting popular support towards 
government than the coercive strategies. In fact, if the government's counterinsurgency 
strategies entail an indiscriminate use of violence, the population could seek the protection of 
the rebels, without considering ideological matters. 
Many authors who attempted to depict extremists’ behavior had to deal with the issue of 
describing terrorism in a rational way. Apart from the various strategies that we depicted 
before, what might be the ratio, for instance, of committing suicide in an optic of personal 
payoff? To assume that each player behaves rationally is fundamental in every game theoretic 
model, but it seems contradictory for terrorists, thinking for example of suicide bombers. 
Caplan (2006) presents a detailed paper about how terrorism and rationality can meet each 
other. He categorized terrorists in three groups: sympathizers, who support terrorism but in a 
passive way; active terrorists, who are part of a terrorist organization; and suicidal 
terrorists, the most extreme category of followers who decide to give away their life for the 
cause. Then the author describes what meanings are commonly given by economists to 
“rationality”, since so far a univocal interpretation has still not been reached. There are three 
main definitions of being “rational”: 
• “having a negatively-sloped demand curve,” or, to put it more generally, 
responsiveness to incentives. 
• Narrow selfishness. 
• Having rational expectations. 
 
Figure 10 summarizes how the various categories of terrorist can fit in rational choice models. 
While sympathizers meet all the definitions of rationality, the challenge for rational choice is 
finding a way to adapt the behavior of active terrorists and especially suicidal terrorists with 
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narrow self-interest and rational expectations. Finally, the conclusion of the paper is that 
terrorists can be considered way closer to “homo economicus” than how it would initially 
seem.  
Figure 10 – Categories of terrorists and rationality 
Source: Caplan, Bryan. 2006. "Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice 
Model." Public Choice 128.1/2 (July) 
 
Another possible rational explanation of terrorism is offered by Azam (2005).  In his model, 
the author links the current generation’s payoff to the next one’s, as it is common in dynastic 
family models. The argumentation is that individuals decide to become suicide bombers 
because doing so increases the probability of the next generation to receive some public good. 
Azam aims at explaining the empirical findings of Krueger and Maleckova (2002), for which 
suicide bombers from the Hezbollah came disproportionately from wealthy families and had 
an above average education level. Azam adds another plausible explanation to this finding: an 
increased educational level is believed not only to raise the opportunity cost of committing 
suicide, but also to make individuals more altruistic towards future generations’ welfare. 
Thus, if this second effect is prevalent, the choice of becoming a suicide bomber assumes 
more rational connotations and can even be interpreted as an altruistic decision. 
Arce and Sandler (2009) discuss the idea of terrorist attacks as a way of costly sending a 
message to the population, in a model where after an attack the government must decide how 
to respond to extremists. As in Mesquita (2007), they claim that terrorists often hope to 
provoke a heavy-handed counterterrorism response by the government that will radicalize 
further the population (the so-called backlash effect), but on the other hand a violent terrorist 
attack could undermine their already present grass-roots base of popular support (erosion 
effect). Thus, terrorists know that they might be exchanging this “backlash” support for the 
grass-roots one when they conduct an attack, and they hope that this trade off will be positive. 
Besides, the government must choose whether to give concessions to extremists or to respond 
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harshly: this decision is based not only on the expected effects on the population, but also on 
the information revealed by terrorists with their attack (the kind of attack modifies the 
government’s beliefs about its opponents’ features). The conclusion is that counterterrorism 
policy and intelligence should appropriately account for the net effects of backlash and 
erosion within the population.  
Kydd and Walter (2002) build another model of bargaining between government, moderates 
and extremists, applying it to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The negotiation described in 
their model has on one side the moderates and on the other the government, which ignores the 
strength of the moderates and their trustworthiness. The moderate group can signal its  
type by taking visible actions against the extremist faction on their side, such as bringing its 
exponents to justice. If though a terrorist act happens, the government could interpret it as a 
signal of the weakness or of the scarce reliability of the moderates, ruining in this manner the 
trust relationship that they were trying to build. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, Kydd and 
Walter argue that it was so hard to reach a peaceful solution between the moderate Palestinian 
Authority and the Israeli government also because Hamas (the extremist faction) kept 
destroying their improved relationships with terrorist attacks. They conclude that for a 
conclusive peaceful settlement it would be necessary for the expected payoff of both sides 
(Palestine and Israel) to be higher. In addition, they suggest the Israeli government to be more 
merciful in front of terrorist attacks and to avoid heavy responses, to finally reach peace in 
Palestine. In Figure 11 the frequency of suicide attacks by Hamas between 2000 and 2007 is 
displayed: this was one of the deadliest periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Figure 11 – List of suicide terrorist attacks by Hamas between 2000 and 2007 
Source: http://www.mepc.org/hamas-agenda-how-has-it-changed 
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5. THE OUTBIDDING BETWEEN PALESTINIAN FACTIONS  
 
As we extensively discussed in the chapter “Main Strategies and Goals of Extremism”, 
terrorism may be used in order to send a message to the domestic audience. In this chapter we 
will analyze further the strategy of outbidding between different factions in the context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian war. Mia Bloom (2004) wrote a detailed paper about how the conflict 
evolved during the period of the first 2000s, analysing the reasons behind the extensive use of 
bombing and suicide terrorism by the Palestinian factions. Her main argumentation is that in 
those years terrorism served at the same time to weaken Israel and to legitimate the outlier 
organizations which competed with the Palestinian Authority for the leadership of the 
community. Since in that period polls revealed that Palestinians’ support for Palestinian 
Authority was decreasing in favour of a mounting approval for suicide bombing, violence was 
an effective strategy to increase a militant group’s prestige and popularity. Surveys conducted 
among Palestinians in the first 2000s seem to confirm this thesis: Figure 12 below shows the 
percentages of Palestinians that supported suicide bombings in the period 1997-2003. The 
peak of support was reached in September 2001, with 85% of Palestinians approving this kind 
of operations. 
 
Figure 12 – Support for Suicide Operations Among Palestinians 
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It must be pointed out that these suicide bombings had a mix of different goals: conventional 
explanations of terrorism attacks employed by Palestinians, for instance, describe them as 
aimed at slowing the improved peace relationships with Israel. This is the “spoiling” strategy 
discussed before: as a matter of fact, Hamas’ violence increased whenever the relationships 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority were improving. Moreover, these attacks may 
have been part of an attrition strategy of the militant groups finalized at persuading Israel that 
they had enough power and resolve to cause massive damages. In addition, there is the 
retaliatory component that played a big part, given the over 60 years of Israel’s military 
occupation in Palestine with several provocative episodes by Israelis, such as the Hebron 
Massacre by Baruch Goldstein in 1994. 
However, these other interpretations do not explain why the domestic audience’s support for 
suicide operations varied so much in the early 2000s. The main reason behind this variance 
was that the extremist groups exploited the Palestinians’ disillusionment with Arafat 
(president of the Palestinian Authority in charge to negotiate the peace treaties with Israel) 
and with the deadlocked peace process to gain share in the political market through terrorism. 
A collateral effect that contributed to the increase in public support for bombings was Israel’s 
initial heavy-handed response to terrorism, with many civilian casualties, that in some way 
legitimated the violence employed by Hamas and by the other extremist groups.  
In the period after November 2000 the support for suicide bombings reached elevated peaks, 
therefore groups that perpetrated martyrdom attacks saw their popularity increasing.  
The popular support for suicide operations was quite low during the period 1997-1999, when 
many Palestinians had faith in the peace process initiated by the Oslo Accords (signed in 1993 
and 1995). In 1999 Hamas’ support experienced its lowest point ever (below 12%), indicating 
that Palestinians believed in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The atmosphere rapidly 
changed in 2000: there was a strong increase in Palestinians’ unemployment and a general 
economic stagnation that grew popular dissatisfaction with the way the peace process was 
being implemented, turning in favor to suicide bombings. The reputation of Palestinian 
Authority’s leaders was being spoiled by corruption scandals and by their incapacity to 
improve the daily lives of Palestinians. Consequently, Hamas focused its efforts on 
spectacular martyrdom operations, to signal to Palestinians its resolve to change the situation 
and thus gaining the support that the weakened Palestinian Authority was losing. After a 
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series of bombings in the beginning of 2000, Hamas saw its share of popularity in public 
opinion polls peaking over 70 per cent. Tired and frustrated by the deadlocked peace process, 
many Palestinians viewed violence as the only way to reach independence and radical Islamic 
groups like Hamas were sponsoring this solution. Arafat’s moderate approach was not 
supported anymore given that he had demonstrated to be incapable of fulfilling the promises 
made to Palestinians, and his legitimacy was being undermined by the suicide bombings. In 
Figure 13 below we can see how the faith of Palestinians in the peace process initiated by the 
Oslo agreements declined after the initial optimism. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Support for Oslo Agreements Among Palestinians 
Source: JMCC polls January 1994 – December 2002 
 
Moreover, the leader of ANP did not manage to maintain monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force in the emerging Palestinian state entity: this vacuum created made diverse groups 
competing and outbidding each other with an impressive series of striking bombing attacks. 
Above from exploiting the weakness of ANP and increasing their political support, suicide 
bombings allowed these organizations to gain international prestige and foreign financial aids 
to keep on fighting Israel. In addition, during 2001 and 2002 most of the polls revealed that 
there was an average 30 per cent of Palestinians who did not trust any of the current leaders, 
leaving a hole in the political field over which the new groups could compete. 
Credibility was acquired through these continuous attacks, and many Palestinian groups 
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rushed forward to claim responsibility for them as soon as they had happened. Violence had 
become a way to signal that the group’s ideology was strong and powerful enough to do what 
ANP and OLP had not been able to accomplish during the previous years. A significant 
example of how effective suicide bombing was in bending popular favor during that period 
was provided by PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), a political group that 
during 2000 was lagging significantly in the polls. In 2001 the PFLP started to use suicide 
bombings and created a separate wing, called Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, devoted exclusively 
to these kinds of operations. After a couple of years when the Brigades conducted 3 per cent 
of all bombing attacks, the PFLP saw its popularity restored and the polls of October 2001 
indicated that its support was increased at 4.3 per cent, more than double of the 2 per cent of 
one year before. Suicide attacks were also a way to appear, or re-appear in the political radar. 
Above from giving credibility to the belonging group, sacrifice was also a source of honor for 
many Palestinians, that could guarantee an improved social status. In addition, becoming a 
suicide bomber even generated financial aid to the family of the bomber. Hamas invested 
many funds in its charitable association, that was created to pay fines and to assist the families 
of who committed suicide or was arrested for the cause. Hamas gained popularity also 
because it was founding hospitals, paying for medical care and prenatal care within the 
Territories; besides, many social services not guaranteed by the Palestinian Authority were 
instead provided by Hamas. Its fund was paying $10000-$25000 for each martyr, giving 
therefore a kind of institutionalization to suicide bombing. Given all these initiatives Hamas 
rapidly increased its prestige and support among all Palestinians at the expenses of the 
Palestinian Authority and of other groups like Al Fatah (which was controlling the Palestinian 
Authority).  
To conclude, these attacks were effective at undermining the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
Authority and subverting Arafat’s leadership, who disappointed many Palestinians. During the 
early 2000s there was a political vacuum in Palestine, with many groups trying to fill it and to 
convince the domestic audience that the violence was the only feasible way to solve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Moving to the links to our model, it will be one of the topic to analyze this use of terrorist 
violence by a political group to outbid another one. As we previously pointed out, one of the 
main ideas that we will discuss is that terrorism is a device useful to signal to the domestic 
audience that the group has deeply-rooted ideological values. We will discuss this power of 
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terrorism to be a signaling instrument to influence the beliefs of the population, investigating 
which could be the situation where a terrorist attack is more advantageous in a context of 
electoral competition. In addition, we will look for a link between the effectiveness of 
terrorism and the perception of corruption among the population. A survey conducted in May 
2002 from Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research revealed that 85% of 
Palestinians believed that there was a diffused corruption in the Palestinian Authority’s 
institutions. This was definitely another element that contributed to undermine the position of 
Arafat and to create this lack of faith in the peace process among Palestinians.  
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6. A NEW MODEL THAT LINKS CORRUPTION TO EXTREMISM 
 
Let’s now introduce the core of this thesis: a new model aimed at rationalizing the 
relationship between corruption and extremism. 
Our goal is to study the effects of corruption on extremism and to explain how terrorism 
influences public opinion. Consider two parties competing to gain the political support of the 
citizens. The party chosen by citizens through elections will have to represent them in the 
negotiations with a hostile government on how to split an uncertain amount of resources. The 
two parties are differentiated by a variable v representing their level of ideology, with a higher 
v standing for a more radicalized group. We will describe three different settings, starting 
from a benchmark one in Section 6.a without corruption or terrorism, then in Section 6.b we 
will add the possibility of bribery between the government and the citizens’ representative and 
finally we will introduce the use of terrorism as a signaling device in 6.c.  But let’s start with 
the description of the timing of the game and after we will move to a more detailed depiction 
of the players’ utility function. 
The timing of the game is the following:  
1) Citizens observe the ideology of the two parties and vote which one has to represent them; 
2) The winner party is revealed; 
3) Nature determines the amount of resources available to the government for negotiations; 
4) Government makes its bid to the chosen party to settle a peaceful deal; 
5) The party decides whether to accept the bid or refuse and engage in a conflict against the 
government. 
 
It is a model of electoral competition: after the elections there will be the bargaining between 
the party chosen and the government, seen as an enemy by the population. For instance, we 
can think of the Palestinian population voting to elect a representative who has to negotiate 
with the Israeli government, or, more recent example, the Catalan secessionists who choose a 
local government that has to bargain with the central Spanish government. 
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Now our duty is to characterize further the players, with their possible payoffs. First, let’s 
describe the variables that will influence their choices. After the elections, nature will 
determine a finite amount of resources R available to the government to bargain: this amount 
could be either high RH or low RL, with RH > RL. Initially the resources are still to be 
determined but citizens are aware that the probability that R will be high is π with 0<π<1. 
Consequently, the assumed probability that R will be low is 1-π.  Starting a conflict has a 
finite and given cost Cg>0 that we assume to be known by all the players. Everyone knows 
that this hypothetical conflict will be won by the government with probability p, given 0<p<1. 
Moreover, if the party wins the conflict it will gain political power and the resources R 
available to the deposed government. We assume that each party’s pay-off from winning the 
conflict is a sum of R and v, meaning that a party obtaining political control will benefit also 
from implementing its ideology (in the case of an Islamic party this could be interpreted as the 
imposition of Shari ‘a). 
Let’s describe the four players with their expected payoffs: 
1. The moderate party is characterized by a low level of ideology vM. Its expected payoff 
from starting a conflict is (1-p)( R+vM) – Cg, while the payoff from accepting the deal 
depends on the offer of the government (we will formalize it soon). On the other hand, 
the expected payoff from losing elections and not being the representative party is 
null. 
2. The extremist party has higher ideological roots vE > vM and its expected payoff from 
starting a conflict is thus (1-p)( R+vE) – Cg. Concluding the negotiations ensures a 
payoff that again depends on how much the government can offer. As for the moderate 
party, the expected payoff from not being the representative party is zero. 
3. We have a representative citizen that must choose which party to vote for. We assume 
that there is no heterogeneity within the population, therefore every other citizen will 
make the same choices of this representative one. As we said, this citizen chooses 
which party must represent him in the negotiations with the hostile government: if the 
party accepts the government’s bid, the citizen will receive the whole amount of the 
offer. Besides, if the party refuses and starts a conflict, the expected payoff of the 
citizen is (1-p)( R) – Cg. As in Mason’s model (1996), here citizens care only about the 
material pay-off: they are informed about the ideological difference between the 
 
 
43 
 
parties and try to predict how they could benefit from it when the negotiations will 
take place. 
4. The government bargains with the winner party and in the negotiations offers a portion 
1-α of the resources owned, with 0<α<1. Thus, the remaining part αR of the resources 
composes the payoff of the government in case that the offer is accepted. In case that 
the offer is refused and there is conflict, the expected payoff of the government is     
pR – Cg. We are thus assuming that the costs of conflict Cg are the same both for the 
party and the government. Furthermore, we assume that the government always 
prefers to avoid the conflict because in any state of nature its probability to win it is 
not sufficiently high to make pR -  Cg > αR even with the lower offer α=0. In other 
words, we have that R< Cg/p both in case that R=RH and R=RL. We assume that all the 
variables characterizing the parties are known by the government. Therefore, in 
equilibrium the government will offer the minimal quantity necessary to make the 
party indifferent between accepting the deal and starting a conflict: 
(1- α)R ≡ (1-p)( R+v) – Cg  
In this context α is the control variable used by the government to make the offer 
match (1-p)( R+v) – Cg, that differs between the two parties since v is different. The 
optimization problem from the point of view of the government is the following one: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼 𝛼𝑅 
subject to (1- α)R ≥ (1-p)( R+v) – Cg 
                0< α <1 
We will thus have 
α*= 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣 −𝐶𝐺
𝑅
     (1) 
Note that we are making the assumption of complete information: every player knows every 
variable or has a rational expectation of what could be its future value. This assumption is 
relevant for example in the dynamics of negotiations: the party elected will observe the true 
realization of R and the government cannot lie about it to pocket a portion of resources. On 
the other hand, the government can observe the true type of the party it has to deal with and 
thus can avoid overbidding.  
Let’s now start from a basic benchmark case without corruption or terrorism and see what is 
the trade-off that the representative citizen has to face in the elections.  
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6.a Benchmark case: no corruption/terrorism 
In this first benchmark framework we suppose that the government and the party are not 
corrupted and none of the two parties has the possibility to make any kind of terrorist attack.  
We have that in the situation where R= RH, the government will offer                                     
(1- α) RH ≡ (1-p) (RH +v) – Cg and we assume that both parties will accept the deal, avoiding 
the conflict. Consequently, if moderates win the elections they will accept a bid of                
(1-p)( RH +vM) – Cg, while in case that the extremists are the representative party they will 
accept an amount equal to (1-p)(RH +vE) – Cg. From this assumption we can trace an upper 
bound for the ideological values of the two parties, that allows the deal to be always possible 
in the case R=RH: 
• vE ≤
𝐶𝐺+𝑝𝑅𝐻
1−𝑝
 
• vM ≤ 
𝐶𝐺+𝑝𝑅𝐻
1−𝑝
 
In this case citizens will obtain the pay-off of the deal entirely, since the ideological values v 
influence just the government’s bid but the parties will not implement their ideology in the 
society. Note that in this situation, α differs between the two bids since trying to reach a 
compromise with a more extreme party will make the government offer more, with a lower α. 
Analytically, we have that with the moderates α*MRH = 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝑀−𝐶𝐺
𝑅𝐻
, while with the 
extremists the government will set its offer with α*ERH = 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝐸−𝐶𝐺
𝑅𝐻
. 
Let’s discuss what happens in the other state of nature, that is when R=RL. In this case we 
assume that the moderates will accept the deal whereas the extremists may engage in a 
conflict depending on how strong their type is. Extremists will start a war if and only if the 
resources RL are too low to allow the offer (1- α) RL to reach (1-p)(RL+ vE) – Cg, even with a 
maximum bid (α =0) .  
In other words, in case that the moderates win the elections and R=RL we will have: 
(1- α) RL ≡ (1-p) (RL+ vM) – Cg  
α*MRL = 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝑀−𝐶𝐺
𝑅𝐿
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On the other hand, if the extremists are the representative party, they will engage in a conflict 
if  
RL   <  (1-p) (RL+ vE) – Cg 
We can express this last condition with respect to the ideology of the party: 
Proposition 1: Suppose R=RL, the extremists will refuse any peaceful deal if 
 𝑣𝐸 >
𝐶𝐺+𝑝𝑅𝐿
1−𝑝
≡ 𝑣𝑤𝑎𝑟 
In the case 𝑣𝐸 ≡ 𝑣𝑤𝑎𝑟 , we have that the only way to avoid the conflict for the government is 
to offer all the resources RL that it owns (α=0). Besides, if 𝑣𝐸 < 𝑣𝑤𝑎𝑟, the peaceful deal with 
the extremists will be possible also in this state of nature with R=RL. 
To simplify our later conclusions, we assume to be in the situation where vE > 𝑣𝑤𝑎𝑟. 
Let’s now take a look at the choice that the representative citizen has to make: the elections 
happen before the negotiations and before the realization of resources, thus nobody knows the 
real value of R yet. The representative citizen here rationally figures out what could be his 
pay-off from voting a party in each possible state of nature and decides accordingly.  
In case the resources are RH, he will prefer to be represented by the extremists since his pay-
off will be larger:   
(1-p) (RH + vM) – Cg< (1-p)( RH + vE) – Cg.  
This because vE > vM : we could interpret this finding by saying that usually a citizen prefers 
to be represented by a more hardline organization in a bargaining context because he is aware  
that they could fight harder to reach a favorable deal. From the point of view of an 
organization, this is one of the advantages of being perceived as more “ideological”, as we 
explained in the section dedicated to outbidding. When the resources are low, the 
representative citizen will get an expected payoff equal to  
• (1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg  in case he votes for the moderates  
• (1-p)( RL) – Cg  if he joins the extreme party, since it will start a conflict. 
 In this situation we have: 
(1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg > (1-p)( RL) – Cg 
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This is because vM >0. Thus, in case R=RL the representative citizen prefers to be represented 
by the moderates.  
Therefore, before the elections and the realization of resources, the expected pay-off of voting 
the moderates is  
PvotM = π((1-p)(RH + vM) – Cg)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg) 
Whereas the expected pay-off of supporting the extremists corresponds to 
PvotE = π((1-p)(RH + vE) – Cg)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL) – Cg) 
It all depends on the relative probabilities of facing a high-resource or a low-resource 
situation, categorized by the parameter π: the more likely it is that R=RH, the more incentive 
the representative citizen will have in joining the extremists while with a low π he will prefer 
to vote for the moderates.  
Analytically, we have that PvotM > PvotE if and only if π < vM/vE .  
Proposition 2: In absence of corruption and terrorism, the representative citizen will prefer to 
vote for the moderates if  𝜋 <  
𝑣𝑀
𝑣𝐸
≡ 𝜋∗ . 
The parameter π could be considered as a proxy of the richness of the country, in terms of 
natural resources for example. This is the argumentation of Ross (2006): whenever a country 
presents an abundance of resources, the expected payoff from engaging in a civil conflict is 
larger and so it is the probability of the outbreak of violence. Extremists’ arguments are more 
influent when the population believes that there is a wide quantity of resources that extremists 
could possibly “steal” from the government, either in a peaceful way (through negotiations) or 
in a violent one. The argument of this section is standard in the literature of delegation in 
negotiations (Manzini, Mariotti 2003). It may be profitable to delegate a “tougher” agent to 
bargain with the other party. 
 
6.b Government offers a bribe 
Let’s now introduce a variation on the previous framework: the government is corrupted and 
offers to the party’s leaders that he has to face a bribe T>0. This bribe is offered with the 
intent to increase the portion α of resources that the government can keep for itself. It is still 
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in the government’s interests to avoid a conflict, given that it guarantees a negative expected 
payoff, thus it will look for a peaceful conclusion of the negotiations. We assume that this 
bribe T has a cost γ(T) that the government must bear. This parameter is a step function of the 
bribe offered:  
𝛾(𝑇)  = {
0, 𝑇 ≤ 𝑇∗
∞, 𝑇 > 𝑇∗
 
 
We assume that the cost for the government to provide a bribe is negligible until a certain 
finite cutoff level T*. If the government offers a bribe higher than this threshold, it gets 
“caught” and it incurs in infinite costs, which could be for example the killing of its leaders or 
huge sanctions from international organizations. The level of this threshold could be 
influenced by the transparency and the strength of the anti-corruption institutions, for 
example, or by the degree of independency of the media. If it is harder to get away with 
corruption, this T* will be smaller, implying a higher probability to get caught.  
The optimization problem of the government therefore changes to the following one: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼,𝑇     𝛼𝑅 − 𝛾(𝑇)𝑇 
Subject to (1- α)R+T ≥ (1-p)( R+v) – Cg 
                 0 < α < 1 
                 T > 0 
Given the cost function that we showed before, we can conclude that the government will 
always offer T*, since it is the maximum bribe with a zero cost or, in other words, the highest 
bribe that can be paid without being discovered and bearing the huge costs that we mentioned. 
Furthermore, we normalize the value for the parties of each unit of T to 1 (in parties’ payoff, 
each unit of the bribe is as much valuable as each unit of R). 
In equilibrium the offer of the government will be: 
R(1- α) + T* ≡ (1-p)( R+v) – Cg  
α*= 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣 −𝐶𝐺−𝑇∗
𝑅
     (2) 
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As we pointed out, offering T* allows the government to increase the portion α of resources 
that it can retain for itself. Confronting (1) with (2) we can easily see that, being T*>0, in the 
second case α* must be higher. Consequently, the bribe gives the possibility to the 
government to settle the deals with lower resources offered to the party. 
In addition, it is important to point out that T represents the bribe benefiting only the leaders 
of the party but not the citizens supporting them, who will get (1-p)( R+v) – Cg – T* in the 
case that the deal is settled. Therefore, citizens will be worse off now with respect to the 
benchmark case because the bribe decreases their payoffs. Thus, there will probably be a 
change in the electoral decisions, since citizens are able to forecast how parties could be 
corrupted and what amount they will receive consequently. 
Let’s discuss how the voting outcome will be modified. In equilibrium, the representative 
citizen makes an exact prediction of what will be the bribe in the negotiations, thus he knows 
the value of T*. 
The bribe T* potentially widens the government’s offer: in the benchmark case the maximum 
offer with α=0 was equal to R, now the maximum offer is R+T*. We again assume that both 
moderates and extremists will reach a deal if the government owns a high quantity of 
resources. From this assumption we have two new upper bounds for the ideological values: 
• vE ≤
𝐶𝐺+𝑇
∗+𝑝𝑅𝐻
1−𝑝
 
• vM ≤ 
𝐶𝐺+𝑇
∗+𝑝𝑅𝐻
1−𝑝
 
In this state of nature we will have: 
α*MRH2 = 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝑀−𝐶𝐺−𝑇∗
𝑅𝐻
 
α*ERH2 = 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝐸−𝐶𝐺−𝑇∗
𝑅𝐻
 
In the case R=RH, the representative citizen again expects to obtain a higher payoff from being 
represented by the extreme party:  
(1-p)( RH+ vE) – Cg –T* > (1-p)( RH+ vM) – Cg – T*  when R=RH 
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The representative citizen foresees that each party will decide to settle a deal with the 
government and both will accept a bribe T* in equilibrium. The government will be better-off 
in this case with respect to the benchmark because the portion α of resources that it can keep 
is higher, both in the negotiations with extremists and moderates (α*MRH2> α*MRH and 
α*ERH2> α*ERH). 
The situation is trickier in the case that R=RL, where the citizen is no more certain of which 
party may advantage him. The moderates will again settle a deal, and in equilibrium the 
government will offer a (1- α*B) portion of resources: 
RL(1- α) + T* ≡ (1-p)( RL+vM) – Cg  
α*B= 𝑝 −
(1−𝑝)𝑣𝑀−𝐶𝐺−𝑇∗
𝑅𝐿
 
On the other hand, we have that if RL+T* < (1-p)( RL+ vE) – Cg ,  there will be no possible 
bribe that allows the government to reach a peaceful agreement with the extremists, who will 
always engage in a conflict. We can express this condition isolating vE: 
Proposition 3: if vE > 
𝑝𝑅𝐿+𝑇∗+𝐶𝐺
1−𝑝
≡ 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 and the extremists are the representative party, 
then they will pursue a conflict when R=RL and buying a peaceful deal through corruption 
will be impossible for the government. 
Similarly to the benchmark case, we have that if 𝑣𝐸 ≡ 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡, the only way to avoid the 
conflict for the government is to offer all the resources RL that it owns (α=0) together with the 
bribe T*. Moreover, if 𝑣𝐸 < 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡, the peaceful deal with the extremists will be possible 
also in this state of nature with R=RL. 
We again assume that in this situation vE is sufficiently high to overcome the threshold 
𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡. Note that this ideological threshold is different than in the benchmark case: we have 
that 𝑣𝑤𝑎𝑟 < 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 , given that T*>0, thus in this case it will be necessary a higher 
ideological value vE to cross this threshold. The first conclusion that we can trace is that 
corruption makes the conflict less likely since the bribe allows the government to “buy” the 
party with which it is dealing. This is the argumentation of Le Billon (2003): corruption might 
be considered as a “tool” to fix a context of political instability. 
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The situation we are depicting is summarized in Figure 14, that gives an overview of what 
may happen in the state of nature R=RL. The blue line represents the minimum offer necessary 
to conclude a peaceful deal with the moderates in equilibrium, making them indifferent 
between the conflict and the deal. The obliquus lines stand for how the offer of the 
government varies with respect to α, both without the bribe (green line) and with it (red line). 
The orange line represents the minimum payoff that a group with v = 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 needs to be 
offered to avoid a conflict: as we can see, the deal is possible only if α=0 and T=T*. If a 
group is characterized by an ideology v > 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡, reaching a deal will be impossible 
because the minimal offer that the group will require will lie in the area over                         
(1-p)( RL+ vConflict) – Cg. Note that without the bribe the government reaches a deal with the 
moderates with α*M1=α*NB, while with the bribe it offers α*B, with α*B > α*NB. As we said, 
the government is better off with the possibility of corruption than without it. 
 
Figure 14 – Parties’ payoffs and government’s offers with respect to α 
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From the point of view of the representative citizen, the expected pay-off from joining the 
extremists in war is still (1-p)( RL) – Cg given that, as we said, they do not care about 
ideological pay-offs. On the other hand, in equilibrium the moderates accept                          
(1- α)RL + T* ≡ (1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg but the citizens expect to receive only                             
(1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg – T*.  
Confronting the representative citizen’s payoffs from voting extremists or moderates in both 
states of nature, we might have three different situations, depending on the threshold T*: 
1. If T*> vE(1-p), in equilibrium the representative citizen will vote for the extremists 
whenever 𝜋 <  
𝑇∗−𝑣𝑀(1−𝑝)
𝑇∗−𝑣𝐸(1−𝑝)
 . Since 𝑣𝑀(1 − 𝑝) < 𝑣𝐸(1 − 𝑝), we have that    
𝑇∗−𝑣𝑀(1−𝑝)
𝑇∗−𝑣𝐸(1−𝑝)
 > 1. Given that 0 < π < 1, we can see that the last condition for π is always 
satisfied. Therefore, we can conclude that whenever T*> vE(1-p), in equilibrium the 
representative citizen will choose the extremists. 
2. If T*< vE(1-p), in equilibrium the representative citizen will vote for the extremists 
when π > 
𝑇∗−𝑣𝑀(1−𝑝)
𝑇∗−𝑣𝐸(1−𝑝)
. Here we are close to the benchmark case: with a low degree of 
corruption, the citizens will prefer the extremists only if they believe that it is likely to 
have R=RH. Note that for T*=0 (bribery is impossible), the conclusion is the same of 
the benchmark case.  
3. If T*= vE(1-p), in equilibrium the choice of the representative citizen will be to vote 
for the extremists, no matter the probabilities of the states of nature. Here the 
condition for the representative citizen to prefer the extremists would be T*> vM(1-p), 
but since T*= vE(1-p) and vE(1-p) > vM(1-p), this condition is always satisfied. 
Summing up these three cases we have: 
Proposition 4: If T*< vE(1-p), the representative citizen will choose to be represented by the 
extremist party when π > 
𝑇∗−𝑣𝑀(1−𝑝)
𝑇∗−𝑣𝐸(1−𝑝)
. On the other hand, if T* ≥ vE(1-p) the representative 
citizen will vote for the extremists no matter the probabilities of the different states of nature.  
Let’s look at a particular situation: we know that for R=RH, the expected payoff of the 
representative citizen from voting the extremists is always larger, but what is the trade-off 
when R=RL? Confronting the two payoffs from voting one group or another, we have that if 
T* is sufficiently high to make (1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg –T* < (1-p)( RL) – Cg, the representative 
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citizen will support the extreme faction even if he knows that this will bring to a conflict. 
After some computations in this last situation we find a sufficient condition for the extremists 
to always be the winner party: 
Proposition 5: If T* > (1-p) vM the representative citizen will vote for the extremists, even if 
this will lead to a conflict. 
Note that in this last particular case, the probabilities of the state of nature π and 1-π do not 
matter anymore since, with a sufficiently high bribe (whenever T* > (1-p) vM), a citizen will 
always choose to support the extremists. 
Therefore, another important conclusion that we have reached is that a certain degree of 
corruption will change the preferences of the population towards more ideological parties. 
This finding confirms the empirical evidence from Henderson and Kuncoro (2011) about the 
Indonesian elections, with citizens from districts more afflicted by bribery shifting their 
choices towards Islamic parties. 
As we argued more than once in the previous chapters of the thesis, the more a social 
community is humiliated and drained of hope because of corruption, the more it will be 
sensible to extremists’ arguments. Anyway, in our model the population does not choose to 
join the extremists because of ideological affinity but because it expects to increase its payoff: 
citizens believe that a hypothetical conflict will free society from all the corruption that has 
impoverished them so far. Therefore, the expected payoff from a conflict does not contain T 
since if extremists win the conflict, they will guarantee to citizens the access to the whole 
resources without compromising with anyone or keeping any “slice of the cake” only for 
themselves. 
 
6.c Terrorism as a signaling device  
So far, we have not introduced the possibility for the parties to utilize terrorism in order to 
send a message to the citizens. In this section we develop the following idea: a party has the 
power to communicate information to the domestic audience through terrorism, which is 
hence used as a signaling device. The interpretation of the usage of terrorism in this manner is 
similar to Mesquita (2010), but while in his model the goal was to tell information about the 
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characteristics of the population, here the aim is to communicate the ideology of the 
organization.  
In this new framework we make some changes to the starting context: first of all, citizens 
have information only about the ideology of the moderate party, while they are uncertain 
about the other party. We have that the type of this other group is unknown to the public since 
it is a “new entrant” in the political panorama. Let’s look at the choice that the representative 
citizen has to face in this new context. 
First, we assume that the moderates will behave like in the last section 6.b if they are the 
winner party. Thus, the representative citizen’s expected payoff from voting the moderates is 
positive, even if smaller than in the benchmark case because of the bribe T*:  
P1votM = π((1-p)(RH + vM) – Cg – T*)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL+ vM) – Cg – T*) ≥ 0 
P1votM < PvotM 
In addition, we assume that conditions (transparency of the media, power of the anti-
corruption institutions...) are such that T* > (1-p) vM.  
On the other side, the representative citizen is doubtful of the new group and believes that its 
type could be either a low 𝑣 or a high ?̅?. Another assumption that we make is that these 
possible types are such that v < vM   and ?̅?  >  𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡. Therefore, if the new group was 
extremist with type ?̅? , the representative citizen would vote for it given that his expected 
payoff is larger than the one guaranteed by the moderates: 
PvotNG = π((1-p)(RH + ?̅?) – Cg – T*)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL) – Cg) > P1votM 
An extremist group would settle a deal with R=RH and engage in a conflict with R=RL but 
with the presence of high corruption (T* > (1-p) vM) makes the representative citizen always 
prefer this outcome than the peaceful deals of the moderates. 
Conversely, if the new group was low-type v (really moderate), the representative citizen 
would never vote for it because the expected payoff that it would guarantee is smaller than the 
moderates since v < vM: 
PvotNG = π((1-p)(RH + v) – Cg – T*)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL+ v) – Cg – T*) < P1votM 
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This new group would settle a peaceful deal with the government in any state of nature, 
always pocketing the bribe T*. 
So, the problem for the representative citizen is that he ignores the type of the new group. 
Without receiving more information, he will make a prediction that the type could be v with a 
probability δ or ?̅? with probability 1- δ, with 0 < δ < 1. Therefore, we will have that the 
expected type of the new group in this case will be: 
E(vNG) = δv + (1-δ) ?̅? 
Furthermore, we assume that E(vNG) ≡ vM : without information on its type, citizens expect 
that this new group will have an “ideology” close to the moderates and thus in equilibrium it 
will behave in the same way, accepting the bribe T* and settling a peaceful deal in any 
situation. From the representative citizen’s point of view, the expected payoff from voting the 
new group will be: 
PvotNG = π((1-p)(RH + E(vNG)) – Cg – T*)+(1-π)((1-p)( RL+ E(vNG)) – Cg – T*) 
Since citizens believe in this case that E(vNG) ≡ vM, we have that PvotNG ≡ P1votM : the payoff 
from being represented by one group or another is expected to be exactly equal. 
Consequently, the representative citizen will vote in a random way and each party may win 
elections with probability=1/2. Now, how could this new group signal its type before the 
elections and, for example, convince citizens that it is more extremist than what they 
expected? 
The solution that the new party has the power to adopt is to make a terrorist attack against the 
government: this act would have no other goals apart from signaling to the domestic audience 
that their ideology is strong and thus they are less prone to corruption than the moderates. We 
assume this terrorist “tool” to be only in the hands of the new group, while the moderates lack 
the capabilities/will to engage in such a strategy. With this strategy, the new group aspires to 
signal that vNG= ?̅? , and we already know that ?̅? > 𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 > vM. We listed the advantages of 
this outbidding strategy in the chapters “strategies of extremism” and “the outbidding between 
Palestinian factions”, explaining how effective it could be in influencing the public opinion. 
Anyway, this attack is not for free but has a given cost CA that the group must bear: this 
parameter is known by each player (parties-government-citizens). In addition, we assume that 
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in case that the new group decides to make the attack, it will happen before the elections 
(indeed, the new group is interested in influencing the citizens only before they vote). 
We may have different equilibria based on the value of CA. Here we assume that this CA might 
have three possible values: high (CAH), medium (CAM) or low (CAL).  Making a terrorist attack 
might be more or less effective on the beliefs of citizens, depending on its known cost. The 
idea is the following one: if terrorism is so cheap to be within any possible type’s reach, using 
it will not convince the representative citizen that the ideology of the new group is strong. 
Let’s discuss these three cases and the equilibria that they reach. 
HIGH COST OF TERRORISM 
If CA is high (CAH), we assume that the representative citizen will expect no party to make an 
attack since he knows that this cost would make the expected payoff from being the elected 
party negative for both kind of groups. Here we formalize the expected payoffs of making the 
attack from the point of view of the two possible group types: 
• If v=?̅?, PA = (π ((1-p)( RH + ?̅?) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL + ?̅?) -  CG) -  CAH < 0 
• If v=v, PA = (π ((1-p)( RH + v) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL + v) -  CG) -  CAH < 0 
Thus, there is a pooling equilibrium in which the new group does not use terrorism, and the 
representative citizen expects the type of the new group to be E(vNG) ≡ vM. Hence, he will vote 
randomly and each party (the moderates and the new group) may win elections with a 
probability equal to ½.   
From the point of view of the new group, the expected payoffs from not making an attack are 
different depending if it is high type or low type, but in each case positive: 
• If v=?̅?, PNA = ½ (π ((1-p)( RH + ?̅?) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL+ ?̅?) -  CG) > 0 
• If v=v, PNA = ½ (π ((1-p)( RH + v) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL + v) -  CG) > 0 
If the new group deviates from this equilibrium and makes an attack, the representative citizen 
will expect that E(vNG) = ?̅? : it is in fact more convenient for the “real” extremists to make an 
attack since their expected payoff from winning the elections is larger. Therefore, the new 
group in this case will be the representative party. Anyway, the new group’s expected payoff 
of deviating from the equilibrium and making the attack is negative, as we explained before, 
thus it has no incentive in exiting from the pooling equilibrium.  
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Proposition 6: If CA= CAH, in equilibrium the new group will not make a terrorist attack and 
the representative citizen will vote randomly. Each party (moderates and new group) will win 
the elections with probability=1/2. 
MEDIUM COST OF TERRORISM 
If CA has a medium value CAM, we assume that the representative citizen expects only the 
“true” extremists to make the attack because its cost makes the payoff of being the elected 
party positive only for v=?̅?: 
• If v=?̅?, PA = (π ((1-p)( RH + ?̅?) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL+ ?̅?) -  CG) -  CAM  > 0 
• If v=v, PA = (π ((1-p)( RH + v) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL + v) -  CG) -  CAM < 0 
Therefore, in this situation we will have a separating equilibrium: if the citizen observes the 
attack, he will know that vNG = ?̅? and will vote for the new group. On the other hand, if there 
is no attack, the representative citizen will know that vNG = v and will vote for the moderates, 
with the new group losing elections. If the new group is low-type, it has no incentives in 
deviating from this separating equilibrium that guarantees a null payoff (losing the elections), 
given that its expected payoff from making an attack is negative. In other words, if the new 
group is not extremist, it will not be incentivized to “mimic” the real extremists by means of 
terrorism. 
From the point of view of the representative citizen, this situation is ideal because there is no 
risk of voting a low-type v: he will in any case understand the true type of the new party. 
Consequently, the representative citizen is able to choose the party that will in the end 
guarantee him the best payoff, could it be the moderates or the extremists. 
Proposition 7: If CA= CAM, in equilibrium the new group will use terrorism if and only if its 
type is high ?̅?. The representative voter will vote for the new group only if he observes the 
attack, otherwise he will vote for the moderates.  
LOW COST OF TERRORISM 
If CA is low (CAL), we assume that it is convenient for any new group’s type to make terrorist 
attacks, thus it will not be useful for the representative citizen to observe terrorism, in order to 
understand the true group’s type. Indeed, the representative citizen expects both kinds of 
group to use terrorism and will not be able to distinguish them: he will then assume that 
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E(vNG) ≡ vM. We will again have a pooling equilibrium with both types of the new group 
winning elections with probability ½. The expected payoff of doing an attack are positive 
from the point of view of both types: 
• If v=?̅?, PA = ½((π ((1-p)( RH + ?̅?) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL+ ?̅?) -  CG) -  CAL) > 0 
• If v=v, PA = ½((π ((1-p)( RH + v) -  CG) + (1- π)((1-p)( RL + v) -  CG) -  CAL) > 0 
If the new group deviates from this equilibrium and does not use terrorism, the representative 
citizen will assume that its type is low, since it is less convenient for low-types to do an attack 
(or, in other words, the expected payoff from winning the elections is less conspicuous if the 
group is less ideological). In this case, the representative citizen will expect that    E(vNG) = v 
and consequently he will vote for the moderates. Therefore, the expected payoff from the 
point of view of the new group of exiting from this pooling equilibrium and not making the 
terrorist attack is zero (losing elections). Consequently, in this situation using terrorism is the 
best strategy for the new group, no matter its type, because it guarantees a positive payoff.  
Proposition 8: If CA=CAL, in equilibrium the new group will make a terrorist attack, no matter 
its type. The representative citizen will vote randomly and each party (moderates and new 
group) will win elections with probability=1/2. 
 
6.d Discussion of equilibria 
We discussed three different cases and we found three critical parameters that influence the 
choices of citizens before the elections: π*, T* and CA. The support granted to an extremist 
movement in our model depends on these variables.  
The first critical parameter is π*: countries with high quantity of resources (or with a high 
probability to have them) are more likely to see extremists taking power, essentially because 
extremists are believed to be more capable to appropriate them in favour of the population. 
Moreover, the presence of natural resources could foster rebellion and increase the probability 
of civil conflicts, as many authors argue (Ross (2006), Collier and Hoeffler (2004)). This 
parameter is determined by nature, therefore it is complicated to gather some policy 
implications for the government to avoid the success of the extremists’ arguments. 
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Then, we have T*, which is the maximum threshold level of corruption that the government is 
able to perpetrate before being caught. T* could be seen as a negative proxy of the strength of 
the anti-corruption institutions of a country, and therefore also a proxy of the level of 
corruption present. As the value of this threshold becomes higher, the population’s support 
bends in favour of extremists. This is one of the most important conclusions of our model: in 
the framework that we depicted, corruption fosters extremism. Possible solutions to avoid this 
phenomenon could be to give more power to the institutions in charge to fight corruption, to 
encourage the independence of the media or the transparency of the government’s activities.  
The last critical parameter is CA. Terrorism increases the possibility of winning the elections 
for the new group from ½ to 1 only in the case that its costs are not low (CA≠ CAL): a terrorist 
attacks influences effectively the belief of the population just if it bears a significant cost. 
Nevertheless, when the costs are medium (CAM) in equilibrium the new group will pursue the 
terrorist strategy only if its type is high ?̅?, while in the case CA = CAL the new group will use 
terrorism no matter its type. If terrorism bears an excessive cost (CA =CAH), in equilibrium the 
new group will not make the attack, even if it is an extremist one. What could influence the 
value of CA? It may depend for example on the regime type, with more authoritarian regimes 
making it more difficult to commit acts of terrorism. Moreover, the “anti-government 
sentiment” of the population could make it easier and cheaper for extremists to engage in 
terrorism, as Mesquita argues (2010). Fearon (2007) claims that another proxy for the cost of 
terrorism could be the orographic conformation of the territory: whenever the landscape is 
more irregular and mountainous it will be easier for terrorists to hide and program their 
attacks. Then, of course, the level of counterterrorism employed by the government raises the 
cost of terrorism. Thus, an increased level of government spending on counterterror activities 
and intelligence could make CA more likely to be in the higher of the three possible ranges. 
This framework can be compared to what happened in Palestine during the first years of the 
2000s, with groups such as Hamas and Al-Fatah competing to gain the support of the 
Palestinians in the negotiations with the Israeli government. The terrorist attacks made by 
Hamas had various goals and one of these was to signal to Palestinians that they were more 
“hardline” with respect to Al Fatah and to the Palestinian National Authority, which was 
implementing the peace process in Palestine under the supervision of Al Fatah.  As we 
described in the chapter “Main strategies of extremism”, this is a situation of outbidding 
between diverse parties: therefore, the most extreme faction will be incentivized to signal of 
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being “hardline” for the reasons we listed previously. In Palestine, after it was clear that the 
peace process initiated by the Oslo accords had failed, and after various years of violence and 
terrorist attacks perpetrated, Hamas won the elections in 2006, notwithstanding all the surveys 
made this possibility seem almost impossible. The extremist group had passed from a 12 per 
cent of popular support indicated by polls of June 2000 to an astonishing 44 per cent in the 
2006 elections. Apart from the disillusionment of Palestinians towards Al Fatah, this success 
is also to attribute to the huge quantity of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel, 
as we pointed out in chapter 5. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has reviewed the fundamental aspects and dynamics of extremist movements and 
has outlined how corrupted activities may foster them. We gave a rational explanation of the 
link between corruption and extremism with the help of a new model that describes both an 
electoral competition and a bargaining framework.  
One of the first conclusions of the model is that the support granted to extremist groups is 
influenced by the abundance of resources present in a country, with a positive correlation 
between support and quantity of resources. In addition, we found that the quantity of 
resources affects the probability of conflict: in our model, a low quantity of resources made 
reaching a peaceful agreement more difficult during the negotiations between the government 
and the party.  Moreover, we concluded that there is a positive relation between how easy it is 
to get away with corruption and how likely it is for an extremist political group to win 
elections. Besides, we demonstrated that the presence of corruption makes it less likely for a 
group to engage in a conflict, given that a bribe could be useful to “buy off” potential 
insurgents.  
We explained that an extremist group is not necessarily a terrorist one but might adopt 
terrorist strategies to advertise its degree of ideology to the population. The effectiveness of a 
terrorist attack on the beliefs of the domestic audience in the model depended fundamentally 
on the cost of making the attack, that we assumed to be known by the population. We can 
argue that whenever an attack is costlier, it is more incisive on the perceptions that the citizens 
have on the group that perpetrated it.  
The delicate question of how to address these problems is left to who is in charge to fight 
extremism and corruption. However, as Sarah Chayes (2015) argues, whenever a western 
government or an international organization intervenes to address these issues in developing 
countries, it has necessarily to be aware of the kleptocratic mechanisms that could contribute 
to generate grievances within the population. It is necessary to support effective law 
enforcement and transparency of the institutions due to fight against the powerful kleptocratic 
networks present in these kinds of countries.     
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